CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS
CLAUSE-MONETARY

COMPENSATION FOR TEMPORARY REGU-

LATORY TAKING IS REQUIRED FOR THE PERIOD DURING WHICH
THE REGULATION IS EFFECTIVE-First English Evangelical Lu-

theran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that private property shall not "be taken for public use
without just compensation."' In light of this constitutional mandate, government agencies have routinely paid monetary compensation to property owners for land which has been formally
condemned for public use.' Nevertheless, the question of what
remedies are sufficient to provide just compensation has not
been without controversy.' One aspect of this controversy has
been the question of what remedies should be available to property owners subject to regulatory takings-the takings effectuated
through governmental land use regulations so restrictive as to
deprive a landowner of all economically viable use of his land.4
In litigating this issue, state and local governments generally argue that an aggrieved property owner's relief should be limited
to the invalidation of the regulation. ' Property owners, on the
I

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

2 See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES

&J.

BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE, 51 (1973) [here-

inafter BOSSELMAN].
3 Costonis, "Fair- Compensation and the Accommodation Power, in REGULATION V.
COMPENSATION IN LAND USE CONTROL: A RECOMMENDED ACCOMMODATION, A CRI-

TIQUE, AND AN INTERPRETATION 21-24 (1977).
4 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The Supreme
Court recognized that "the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the [police power] more and more until at last private property disappears" and held that a

government land use regulation which "goes too far" may constitute a taking
within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Id. Thus, in addressing the question of
whether a taking has occurred, courts have considered both physical occupation of
property by a governmental agency, and regulatory measures enacted by the
agency. See Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q 491, 495, 499 (1981). Typically, courts have categorized physical occupation
as a greater intrusion on property rights than regulatory action and have been more

inclined to find that a taking has occurred when physical occupation was involved.
See BOSSELMAN, supra note 2, at 106.
5 See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 627 (1981)
(City of San Diego relying on California Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City
of liburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), limiting remedy for regulatory taking to invalidation or declaratory relief); Agins v. City of
[iburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375-76 (1979),
aff'd on other~groun, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (California court held invalidation to be
sole remedy available to a landowner for a regulatory taking).
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other hand, contend that they are entitled to monetary compensation for the value of the lost use of their land during the period
in which the regulation was in effect. 6
Until recently, the United States Supreme Court had declined to consider the remedies involved concerning a regulatory
taking.7 In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, ' the Court finally addressed this matter.9
The Court held that under proper circumstances the fifth amendment requires that property owners receive monetary relief for
the period of time during which a regulatory taking was in
effect. '
In 1957, the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale (Church) purchased land in the Angeles National Forest along the banks of Mill Creek."' Although located along "the
natural drainage channel for a watershed area owned by the National Forest Service,"'" the Church used the property called
"Lutherglen," as a retreat and recreational facility.' 3 The
Church operated Lutherglen until February 1978, when run-off
from a heavy storm overflowed the banks of Mill Creek flooding
and destroying Lutherglen.' 4 In January 1979, in response to the
severe flooding problem, the County of Los Angeles (County)
6 See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 626; Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'don
other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); (landowners contend that they are entitled to a
remedy in damages).
7 See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986)
(Supreme Court failed to reach the issue of remedies due to its finding that no final
determination regarding the taking claim had been reached and therefore the case
was not ripe for review); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1985) (Supreme Court held that remedies claimed
were premature because of the failure to obtain a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Supreme Court declined to determine the remedies issue because a final judgment was not rendered by the lower court); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980) (Supreme Court declined to address the remedies issue based on its finding that a taking had not occurred and that the question
regarding compensation for regulatory takings was moot).
8 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
0 Id. at 312.
I0 Id. at 321.
I I Id. at 307.
12 Id. A drainage channel or watershed is the land area which contributes surface runoff to rivers and streams. See ABA, MATERIALS ON FLOODPLAINS AND WETIANDS: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS AND OPTIONS, §§ 2-1 to 2-5 (R. Robbins & D. Lagerroos
eds. 1981) [hereinafter FLOODPLAINS & WETLANDS].
I'- First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
14 Id. The Church contended that the flood and resultant damage to Lutherglen
was the result of a forest fire in July of .1977 which "denuded the hills upstream
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adopted an ordinance prohibiting all construction and reconstruction within a designated flood plain area. 5 The area affected by the ordinance included a portion of the Church's
property where Lutherglen previously had been located.1"
The Church subsequently filed suit against the County and
the Los Angeles County Flood Control District in the Superior
Court of California, alleging, among other things, that the ordinance denied the Church of all use of Lutherglen.' 7 The Church
sought monetary damages based on a claim of inverse condemnation.'" Following California precedent, the trial court held
from Lutherglen, destroying approximately 3,860 acres of the watershed area and
create[d] a serious flood hazard." Id.
15 Id. at 307-08. Interim Ordinance No. 11,855 was adopted by the County of
Los Angeles (County) in January 1979. Id. at 307. The ordinance was "an interim
ordinance temporarily prohibiting the construction, reconstruction, placement or
enlargement of any building or structure within any portion of the interim flood
protection area delineated within Mill Creek." Id. at 326-27 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The County contended the ordinance was necessary to preserve and
maintain the public health and safety. Id. at 307.
This power to protect and enhance the public health, safety and general welfare has been interpreted as being reserved to state governments, for the benefit of
their citizens, through the tenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
FLOODPI.AINS & WETLANDS, supra note 12, at § 6-1. Under this power, states retain
jurisdiction to regulate floodplain areas. See id. The severe threats that flooding
presents to the health, safety and general welfare of the public justifies local governmental regulation of floodplain areas through the exercise of their police powers. See id. §§ 6-1 to 6-2; Mandelker, supra note 4, at 501-02; see also Agins v. City of
[iburon, 477 U.S. 255, 261 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (both cases upholding the right of local authorities to
regulate land use to protect the public welfare).
16 First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
17 Id. at 308. A claim for loss of use is synonymous to a claim that a taking
occurred. See Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for Regulatoy Takings, 8

L.Q. 517, 521-22 (1981). The Church's amended complaint additionally alleged that the County was liable for the destruction of Lutherglen due
to the dangerous conditions resulting from the forest fire on the County's properties upstream of Lutherglen which contributed to the previous flooding. First English, 482 U.S. at 308. The Church also sought damages in tort for cloud seeding by
the County during the storm that caused the floods which destroyed Lutherglen.
HASTINGS CONST.

Id.
iS First English, 482 U.S. at 308. Inverse condemnation is the term used to de-

scribe a cause of action by a landowner against a government entity under which
the landowner seeks to recover monetary compensation for the taking of property
in instances where the government entity has failed to commence formal condemnation proceedings. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
637 n.2 (1981) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
In the typical condemnation proceeding, the government brings ajudicial or administrative action against the property owner to take "the fee
simple or an interest in his property .... In an "inverse condemnation"
action, the condemnation is "inverse" because it is the landowner, not
the government entity, who institutes the proceeding.
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that inverse condemnation was not an available remedy to a landowner seeking relief from a regulatory taking and granted the
County's motion to strike the Church's claim for loss of the use
of Lutherglen. ' The California Court of Appeal affirmed," and
the California Supreme Court denied review. 2
Granting certiorari, 2 2 the United States Supreme Court reversed the state court decision.2 3 The Court held that where
property has been taken without just compensation as a result of
an excessive land use regulation, the landowner is entitled to
compensation for the period the regulation was in effect.24 The
Court further held that monetary compensation was required
even when the regulation was subsequently revoked.2 5
Challenges to land use regulations arise out of the inherent
conflict among three basic rights: a landowner's traditional property rights, the government's power of eminent domain and the
government's right, through its police powers, to regulate property use for the public welfare. 2" The fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution reserves to the government the right
Id. (citations omitted).
19 First English, 482 U.S. at 309. The trial court relied on Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 477 U.S. 255 (1980). Under the Agins decision, a property owner's remedy
for a regulatory taking was limited to invalidation rather than monetary compensation through inverse condemnation. Id. at 276-77, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
378.
20 First English, 482 U.S. at 309. The California Court of Appeal found itself
obligated to follow Agins both because Agins demonstrated the most recent stand on
the issue taken by the highest court of that state, and " 'because the United States
Supreme Court ha[d] not yet ruled on the question of whether a state may constitutionally limit the remedy for a taking to nonmonetary relief....' " Id.
21 Id. at 309. InAgins the California Supreme Court set out a policy of denying
monetary damages for regulatory takings. See Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 275-77, 598 P.2d
at 29-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78.
22 478 U.S. 1003 (1986).
23 First English, 482 U.S. at 322.
24 Id. at 321-22.
25 First English, 482 U.S. at 322. The Court stressed that its decision did not
mean that every land use regulation enacted would require that compensation be
paid, but rather, that compensation would be required only in instances in which a
regulation is in fact deemed to constitute a taking. Id. Additionally, the Court's
decision specifically excluded "normal delays in obtaining building permits,
changes in zoning ordinances, variances and the like." Id. 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
26 See Comment,Just Compensation orJust Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages
Remedy n ChallengingLand Use Regulations, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 711, 712 (1982). The
term property is "Iiln the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. . . . More specifically, ownership; the
unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every
legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with
it." BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1095 (5th ed. 1979). The right of eminent domain,
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to appropriate private property for public use. 7 This right of
eminent domain requires that just compensation be paid to the
aggrieved property owner. 2 The government also has an implied right under the United States Constitution to regulate the
use of private property in order to protect the health, safety and
welfare of the community. 29 The right of the government to regor right of "taking," originated from the right of the government to seize land.
BOSSELMAN, supra note 2, at 51.
There are three basic means by which the federal government can exercise its
right of eminent domain. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3
(1984). The most traditional method is by the initiation of condemnation proceedings. Id. Condemnation proceedings involve the filing of a complaint by a government for a court determination of the value of the property to be taken. Id. at 3-4.
After such value is determined, the governmental entity has the option of either
purchasing the property at the determined price or dismissing the proceeding. Id.
at 4. A second method by which the federal government can take private property
is pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 258a. Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 3. This statute empowers
the federal government
"at any time before judgment" in a condemnation suit, to file "a declaration of taking signed by the authority empowered by law to acquire
the lands [in question], declaring that said lands are thereby taken for
the use of the United States." The Government is obliged, at the time
of the filing, to deposit in the court .... an amount of money equal to the
estimated value of the land. Title and right to possession thereupon
vest immediately in the United States. In subsequent judicial proceedings, the exact value of the land . . . is determined, and the owner is

awarded the difference (if any) between the adjudicated value of the
land and the amount already received by the owner, plus interest on that
difference.
Id. at 4-5 (footnote and citation omitted). The third method by which the federal
government may take private property is where "Congress ...exercises the power
of eminent domain directly.... [by] enact[ing] a statute appropriating the property
immediately by 'legislative taking' and setting up a special procedure for ascertaining, after the appropriation, the compensation due to the owners." Id. at 5.
The government's right to regulate private property is derived from "certain
powers, existing in the sovereignty of each State in the Union, somewhat vaguely
termed police powers, the exact description and limitation of which have not been
attempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly stated .. .relate to the safety,
health, morals and general welfare of the public." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 53 (1905).
27 See U.S. CONsr. amend V. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part
that "[nior shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." Id. This clause, generally referred to as the "just compensation" clause,
applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
28 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
29 R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN,
107-10 (1985). While the United States Constitution makes no express reference
to a right of police power, it has, by implication, been read into the Constitution.
Id. at 107-08. "It would be a very odd construction of the Constitution that denied
...governments the minimum capacity to maintain peace and good order when
those are the central functions of government itself." Id. at 108.
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ulate the use of private property, commonly referred to as the
police power, while broad, is not without limits." There is a
point at which government regulation of private property becomes a "taking" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 3'
The point at which a land use regulation becomes a taking is
not set forth in the fifth amendment:" The United States
Supreme Court has been unable to develop a clear formula for
determining when a regulation goes so far as to constitute a taking.3 3 The Court has held that within the context of the fifth
amendment, the term "taken" includes governmental exercise of
the right of eminent domain, 3 4 governmental action resulting in
direct physical invasion of property"5 and governmental regulation of property which renders such property valueless or
unusable. " ' Whether accomplished by physical invasion, condemnation, regulation or any other exercise of the police power,
a taking is a governmental action which deprives the individual of
property rights."7
In 1926, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Court addressed a constitutional challenge to a comprehensive zoning or30 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). The Supreme
Court noted:
Government hardly could go on if, to some extent, values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed
under an implied limitation, and must yield to the police power. But
obviously the implied limitation must have its limits ....
Id.
• Id. at 415. As stated by Justice Holmes, "The general rule, at least, is that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking." Id.
32 See Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment:Justice Bremna Coionts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15, 50 (1983).

33 See id. at 20. The Court has acknowledged the lack of a set formula for determining when a regulatory taking occurs. Each case is reviewed and decided on its
own facts. Id. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
34 Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9 (1983).
35 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265-66 (1946) (holding that continuous invasion of property by low-flying aircraft constituted a direct invasion of
property and resulted in a taking); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall)
166, 181 (1871) (holding that erection of a dam that resulted in a flooding of landowner's property and destruction of its usefulness constituted a taking).
36 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960) (holding that destroying value of liens constituted a taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (holding that
state statute which deprived owner of all economic value of property constituted a
taking).
'17 See Bauman, supra note 32, at 50.
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dinanceA8 The Court held that a determination of the validity of
land use regulations requires a balancing of the government's
right to protect the public health, safety and general welfare
against the private citizens' property interests." Despite the impact of land use regulations on private property values and their
restrictions on property rights, the United States Supreme Court
upheld governmental imposition of land use controls as a valid
exercise of the police power.' The Court indicated, however,
that a landowner could properly challenge the specific impacts of
a zoning ordinance on a case-by-case basis. 4 ' Such a challenge
would require the examining court to take into consideration the
nature of the restrictions imposed along with the particular circumstances involved.4 2 As a result of Euclid, early challenges to
the validity of zoning regulations were largely based on landowner allegations that the ordinance under attack violated the
due process guaranties of the fourteenth amendment. 4 ' By seeking to invalidate the offending regulation or to enjoin application
of the regulation to the specific property involved, landowners
did not pursue a compensation remedy under these early
challenges.44
Notwithstanding the general validity of land use regulation,
: 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Village of Euclid, Ohio, enacted "a comprehensive
zoning plan for regulating and restricting the location of trades, industries, apartment houses, two-family houses, single family houses, etc., the lot area to be built
upon the size and height of buildings." Id. at 379-80. A landowner sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance on the grounds that it violated
the due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment in that it reduced and
destroyed the value of his land and prohibited the land's natural development.
3,J Id. at 387. Generally, the courts are reluctant to invalidate governmental regulations falling within the purview of the police power. See, e.g., Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978). Initially, the common law
theory of nuisance was used to sanction governmental regulations enacted to prevent a public harm. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 112-14. Generally, land use
regulations have been upheld as a permissible governmental action when promoting "the health, safety, morals or general welfare" despite their infringement on
real property rights. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124-25 (1978).
40 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397.
4 1 See id.
42
4'
44
sion

See id.
Bauman, supra note 32, at 76.

See id. See a/so Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). The deciin .Vectow was instrumental in establishing that land use regulations could be

successfully challenged under the fourteenth amendment's due process provisions.
Id. at 188-89. A successful challenge requires the plaintiff to show either that the
regulations are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or that the restrictions imposed are not rationally related to the desired goal. See id. at 187-88.
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the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,4 5 had made
it clear that a land use regulation could also be challenged under
the fifth amendment as a taking. 4"' The Mahons were the owners
of a home built on property once owned by the Pennsylvania
Coal Company.4 7 The company expressly had reserved the right
to mine coal on land on which the home was built.4" The
Mahons sought to enjoin the coal company from exercising its
mining rights based on a Pennsylvania statute regulating mining
operations. 4 ' The Pennsylvania statute, known as the Kohler
Act, prohibited the mining of coal if it would result in the collapse of any type of structure used for human habitation. ° In an
opinion by Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court invalidated the
Kohler Act as an excessive use of the state's police power." Using a balancing approach which placed the state's police and eminent domain powers at opposite ends of a scale, the Court held
that "[t]he general rule, at least, is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."15 2 The Court observed that the "constitutional way" to remedy the inequity in a taking situation is to
53
compensate the owner for the loss.
Following Euclid,5 4 case law evinces a plethora of state courts
addressing the validity of land use regulations. 55 As challenges
to the validity of land use controls in the state courts proved un45 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
46 See id. at 415. Historically, physical takings cases were decided under a theory
of eminent domain, while takings resulting from stringent regulation were deemed
an unconstitutional exercise of the police power. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. It has been argued that although the police power and the government's
power of eminent domain are at opposite ends of the spectrum of governmental
power, often the two have proven to be difficult to distinguish. Bauman, supra note
32, at 53.
47 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
48

Id.

49

Id. (citation omitted).

5o Id. at 412-13 (citation omitted).
5
52
53

Id. at 414.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 416.

54 BOSSELMAN, supra note 2, at 138. Because of the virtual retirement of the
Supreme Court from land use cases after the 1920's, the Court's analysis in Pennsylvania Coal has set the only guidelines for the state courts to follow in subsequent
land use regulation cases. Id. See also Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). These cases set forth
the last definitive stands taken by the Supreme Court on issues of zoning for a
forty-six year period. Bauman, supra note 32, at 71.
55 See BOSSELMAN, supra note 2, at 138.
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successful,5" landowners began seeking compensation for economic losses resulting from regulatory takings under the theory
of inverse condemnation.5 7 Consequently, the states began to
consider the types of remedies that should be available to a land58
owner whose property has been subject to a regulatory taking.
In the absence of a Supreme Court decision on point, state
courts independently determined whether a landowner's remedy
for a regulatory taking was limited to an invalidation of the regulation.5 ' Consequently, over time, state court decisions addressing the remedies issue exhibited little uniformity."" At one end
53 See, e.g., Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 477-78, 373
N.E.2d 255, 260, 402 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365-66 (1977) (holding aesthetics to be a valid
basis for the exercise of the police power);Just v. Marinett County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 17,
201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972) (upholding building restrictions on waterfront property limiting use of property consistent with its natural state).
57 See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 34547 (1986); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 626
(1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 (1980).
As the types and extent of land use regulations expanded and greater financial
losses were incurred by landowners unable to sell their property at pre-regulation
market values, landowners increasingly turned to inverse condemnation proceedings for relief. Comment, supra note 26, at 715. In these instances landowners
viewed mere invalidation as an inadequate remedy. See id. at 732. Landowners also
sought relief on a theory of inverse condemnation because attempts at invalidation

proved futile as nothing prevented "the regulating entity from subsequently impos-

ing a modified or alternate restriction which achieve[d] the same result, plunging
the property owner into another expensive and time-consuming round of litigation." Id. at 732-33. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621, 655-56 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing that where a substantial period of time has elapsed in connection with a landowner's attempt to
have a regulation invalidated, mere invalidation is insufficient compensation).
58 See Comment, supra note 26, at 716-19. There are two main arguments raised
by advocates of limiting the remedy for a regulatory taking to invalidation. See id. at
7Z24-32. First, they suggest limiting available remedies gives the regulating agency
an opportunity to bring the regulation within constitutional constraints or, in the
alternative, of continuing the regulation and paying compensation. Id. at 725. Second, they assert that unless governmental authorities are first offered the option to
invalidate the offending regulation, a chilling effect on beneficial land use controls
will result, causing governmental agencies to refrain from implementing innovative
land use policies for fear of financial liability. Id. at 726-32.
There are three main arguments raised by proponents of a remedy in damages.
Id. at 732-40. First, they suggest that invalidation is often an inadequate remedy for
the temporary loss resulting from the regulation. Id. at 732. Second, they maintain
that invalidation frequently results in an endless stream of litigation due to the abilitv of a municipality to enact subsequent land use regulations, slightly modified, but
accomplishing the same result as the previously invalidated regulation. Id. Third,
they assert that allowing damages for regulatory taking regulations will insure that
planners exercise their best judgment in drafting regulations designed to strike a
fair balance between regulation and the rights of property owners. Id. at 73 1-32.
59 See id. at 716-18.

O Id. at 716. State courts have adopted a variety of positions on the issue of
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of the spectrum, California limited the landowner's remedy in the
case of a regulatory taking to invalidation."' At the other extreme, New Hampshire expressly rejected the California view, in
favor of a monetary compensation remedy.6 2 Aware of the lack
of uniformity in state court decisions, landowners looked to the
federal courts and challenged the ability of the state courts to
limit the remedy for a regulatory taking to invalidation. 6 3
The United States Supreme Court had its first opportunity
to resolve the issue of whether a state may restrict the remedies
available to a landowner affected by a regulatory taking in Agins v.
City of Tiburon."4 The City of Tiburon adopted an ordinance restricting the density of development in certain areas within the
city limits." 5 As a result of the ordinance, the Agins' ability to
develop their land was severely curtailed, as was their anticipated
profit from the proposed development. 6 6 The Agins filed a claim
against the city in the California Superior Court alleging that the
ordinance constituted a taking of their property without compensation and sought damages on a theory of inverse condemnation."7 While the California Supreme Court found that no taking
had occurred based on the facts presented,"' it noted that inverse
condemnation was not an appropriate remedy for a regulatory
taking.""' The court asserted that a landowner challenging the validity of an ordinance was limited to recovery through declaratory
relief or mandamus. 7 0 The United States Supreme Court
whether invalidation is a sufficient remedy for a landowner affected by a regulatory
taking. See id. at 717-18 nn. 48-51.
(i1 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276-77, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372, 378 (1979), aff'don other grounds, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980).
62 See Burrows v.City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981) (holding that
a compensation remedy may be available when a landowner's property has been the
subject of a regulatory taking).
63 See Comment, supra note 26, at 719.

447 U.S. 255 (1980).
Agmns, 24 Cal. 3d at 271, 598 P.2d 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374. The purpose of
the ordinance was to prevent unnecessary urbanization of undeveloped land. Agins,
447 U.S. at 261 n.8.
See Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 271-72, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
""
67 Id. at 272, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
68 Id. at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378. The California court held
that the ordinance was an exercise "of the city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from the ill effects of urbanization. Such governmental purposes
long have been recognized as legitimate." Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 (footnote
omitted).
69 Agbis, 24 Cal. 3d at 275, 598 P.2d at 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
70 Id. at 276-77, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378. The California Supreme
Court stated that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional only if it deprives the land64

65
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granted certiorari,7" and affirmed the California Supreme Court's
decision that no taking had occurred but never reached the question of whether compensation was an available remedy for regulatory takings. 2
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,"8 the United
States Supreme Court once again refused to reach the issue of
whether compensation was an appropriate remedy for a regulatory taking.74 San Diego Gas & Electric Company had assembled
a large tract of land for the construction of a nuclear power
plant. 75 At the time of purchase, the tract was zoned predominantly for industrial or agricultural uses. 7 " Subsequently, the city

rezoned portions of the company's property from industrial to
agricultural and open space uses. 7 7 Additionally, portions of the
company's property zoned for open space use were designated
for potential purchase by the city.78 Unable to use the portions
of its property zoned for open space, the company filed suit
against the city in the California Superior Court alleging that its
property had been taken and sought damages under the theory
of inverse condemnation.7 1" The superior court concluded that a
taking had occurred and that the company was entitled to compensation.'" The California Court of Appeal affirmed." The
California Supreme Court remanded the case to the appellate
court in light of its Agins decision.12 On remand, the appellate
owner of "all reasonable use of his property." Id. at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 378.
71 444 U.S. 1011 (1980).
72 Agitis, 447 U.S. at 263.
73 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
74 Id. at 623.
75 Id. at 624.
76 Id.
77 Id.

at 624-25. "The city's plan defined 'open space' as 'any urban land or
water surface that is essentially open or natural in character, and which has appreciable utility for park and recreation purposes, conservation of land, water or other
natural resources or historic or scenic purposes.' " Id. at 637 n. I (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
78 See id. at 625.
71. Id. at 625-26. The company claimed that by adopting an open-space plan the
city had denied it of all reasonable use of its property. Id. at 626.
80 Id. at 626-27.
81 Id. at 627.
82 Id. at 628. Agins

and San Diego Gas & Elecric were decided within the same year
by the California courts. Decided first, Agins established the California position of
refusing to grant a compensation remedy when challenging land use regulations.
Agins v. City of [iburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 275, 598 P.2d 25, 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372,
376 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See Mandelker, supra note 4,
at 493-94.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

1052

[Vol. 18:1041

court, following Agins, reversed the trial court." The California
Supreme Court declined further review. 4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,8 5 but
ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the case
because the California Court of Appeal had failed to enter a final
judgment.8" Because the case was decided on procedural
grounds, the Court did not address the merits of the remedies
issue.

87

Notwithstanding the majority's failure to review the remedies issue, Justice Brennan addressed the issue directly in a dissenting opinion.88 Justice Brennan noted that case precedent
held that arbitrary or excessive use of the police power can constitute a fifth amendment taking, entitling the property owner to
just compensation. t Justice Brennan based his analysis on the
express language of the fifth amendment and on prior United
States Supreme Court cases interpreting it... He concluded that
"once a court finds that a police power regulation has effected a
'taking,' the government entity must pay just compensation for
San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 629.
Id. at 630.
85 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 447 U.S. 919 (1980).
86 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 632-33. Under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257
the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court is limited to the review of final
judgments by a state court. Id. at 633. Although the California Court of Appeal
had concluded that monetary compensation was not an available remedy for a regulatory taking, it had "not decided whether any other remedy [was] available because
it ha[d] not decided whether any taking in fact ha[d] occurred." Id. Consequently,
the court's decision was not final. Id.
87 Id. at 623.
88 Id. at 636-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart, Powell and Marshall
joined in Justice Brennan's dissent. Id. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion, indicated that had he not agreed that procedural defects prevented the Court from reaching the merits of the case, he would
have joined injustice Brennan's opinion. Id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist,J., concurring).
89 Id. at 648-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (recognizing that the police power is limited b%1he just
compensation clause); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding
excessive governmental regulation under the commerce clause to be a taking);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (determining a
balance to be struck between valid regulation and a taking); Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (acknowledging that police power can be exercised in an unconstitutional manner); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 68 (1979)
(holding "prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired property ... does not effect a
taking in violation of the [flifth amendment"); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
269 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding a regulation that goes too far will be deemed to be a
taking)).
90 Id. at 654-55 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S.
253 (1980); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933)).
83
84
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the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected
the 'taking,' and ending on the date the government entity
chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation. '")' Injustice Brennan's opinion, the fact that the government regulation
was subject to amendment or repeal did not make the just compensation clause any less applicable. z The Justice concluded,
however, that the just compensation clause does not give courts a
right to compel initiation of a condemnation proceeding in instances where a taking is temporary and reversible. ' In those
instances, the government retains the right to rescind the offending regulation with any compensation due the landowner to be
determined based upon standard methods used to calculate the
value of the temporary use of the property."'
On two additional occasions, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the issue of whether landowners must be
compensated when a governmental regulation has resulted in a
temporary taking of their property. :' 5 In both instances procedural problems prevented the Court from addressing the issue.""
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank, 7 subsequent to the approval of a preliminary plat for the
development of the landowner's property, but prior to completion of the development, the county revised its zoning ordinance.") The county applied the old ordinance requirements to
the developer's tract for a period of two years." ' Thereafter, the
county applied the requirements of the new ordinance to the undeveloped portions of the developer's property and all subse0°
quent proposals for further development were disapproved.'
Protesting the application of the new ordinance to its prop:i'Id. at 658 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
92 1d. 450 U.S. at 657 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Id. at 658 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
I:
94

See id.(citing Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939)).

9'1 See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348
(1986) Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 185 (1985).
1'4' See MacDonald, Soimer & Frtes v. County oTYolo, 477 U.S. at 348-49; Villiamson
ComilV Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamillon Bank, 473 U.S. at 185.
97 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
IId. at 177-78.
99 See id. at 178.
im0 Id. at 179-82. The developers preliminary plat was based on a cluster zone

development with a total of 736 residential units. Id. at 177. Under the revised
cluster density regulations, development would be limited to a total of 548 units.
Id. at 179. In addition, eight other violations of the new ordinance were also cited
inthe planning commission's rejection of the developer's revised preliminary plat.
See id. at 188.
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erty, the developer filed suit in the district court of Tennessee
against the county's Planning Commission under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act." 1 The developer's complaint alleged that
application of the new ordinance to the undeveloped portions of
0 2
its property constituted a taking without just compensation.1
The jury found that a temporary taking had occurred and
awarded the developer $350,000.00 in damages. 0 3 Notwithstanding the jury's findings, the district court held that a taking
had not occurred and vacated the jury award.'0 4 Nevertheless,
the court also granted the developer injunctive relief.'1 5 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying the reasoning of Justice
Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric, reinstated the jury
award, holding that where a taking has occurred, just compensation must be paid.o" In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wellford,
however, argued that by finding a compensatory taking the majority had incorrectly relied on case law which was not on
point. 0 7 Thejudge reasoned that cases in which the government
took physical possession of a landowner's property for a temporary period were distinguishable from cases where land use controls imposed a temporary restriction on the landowner's right to
develop his property. '" The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide the compensation issue, and again
ruled that the compensation issue was not ripe for review.'"')
In MacDonald,Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, " o a developer
filed suit in the California Superior Court for inverse condemnaIoI Id. at 182. Under section 1983, a private monetary action is available to private individuals for infringement of their federally protected rights. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1984). This remedy has been held to encompass private actions against
municipalities "for violations of 'any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws.' " Mandelker, supra note 4, at 506 (citation omitted).
Because section 1983 also allows injunctive remedies, the question of whether
monetary damages will be awarded is an open issue. See id. at 510-12.
102 ll'illiamisot
County, 473 U.S. at 182.
10 3 Id. at 183.
104 Id.
I05 Id.
Io60
Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d
402, 409 (6th Cir. t984). The court of appeals found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that a taking had occurred. Id. at 409.
107 Id. at 412 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
Io' Id.
' lWilliamsom Countv, 473 U.S. at 185. The Court found the developer's claims to
be premature in that the developer did not first seek to obtain zoning variances in
order to develop the property. Id. at 188. Consequently, the appellant had not
exhausted his state remedies before seeking federal judicial intervention. See id. at
190-91.
It(o 477 U.S. 340 (1986).

NOTES

1988]

1055

tion after approval of its application for development was denied. " In its complaint, the developer alleged that the county
was restricting its property to open-space use by refusing to approve its proposed plans for development.'" The California Superior Court held "that, irrespective of the insufficiency of [the
developer's] factual allegations, monetary damages for inverse
condemnation are foreclosed by the California Supreme Court's
decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon."'"13 The United States
Supreme Court again failed to rule on the remedies issue by
holding that the decision on appeal was not ripe for review.'
Only injustice Byron White's dissent were the merits of the issue
addressed.''" Justice White concluded that if a taking has occurred, even if only temporarily, just compensation must be
paid.'' 6
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles,'"' marked the fifth attempt by the United States
Supreme Court this decade to address the remedies involved in a
regulatory taking.'
In First English the Supreme Court finally
considered the question of whether the fifth amendment requires
a compensation remedy for temporary regulatory takings.""
The Court ruled that "where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was

effective."

121

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that
there were no concerns with the ripeness of the Church's claim
which would prevent the remedies issue from being considered
by the Court. 12 ' Recognizing the remedies issue as being
III See id. at 342-43.

12 Id. at 344.
'13 Id. at 345-46.
114 Id. at 351-53. Once again, the Court concluded that appellants had not exhausted available state remedies before seeking judicial intervention. Id.
'15 Id. at 353-64 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell and
Justice Rehnquist joined with Justice White in the dissent. Id. at 353.
i1 Id. at 362-63 (White,J., dissenting).
117 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
118 Id. at 310-11.
'11 Iid. at
120 Id. at

313.
321.
121 Id. at 310-1I. The Court referred to the fact that on four prior occasions it
was unable to address the issue of remedies due to concerns of finality. Id. at 310.
It found this case distinguishable from the prior cases because of the position of the
California courts that damages are an unavailable remedy in connection with a reg-
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"squarely presented,"'2 2 the Chief Justice addressed "the question of whether the just compensation clause requires the government to pay for 'temporary' regulatory takings."'' M The
Court's analysis focused on the purpose of the just compensation
clause and the manner in which it has been applied.' 2 4 The
Court asserted that the Constitution guarantees property owners
a right to just compensation in instances where the government's
interference with their property interests constitutes a taking.1 25
The Court recognized that an affected landowner has two methods of securing just compensation.' 2 " First a landowner may
commence an action in inverse condemnation. 2 7 Second, a
landowner may secure just compensation through governmental
exercise of its eminent domain power.' 2 1 In addition, governmental regulation, when it "goes too far" can trigger application
12
of the just compensation clause. 9
The Court then addressed the issue of whether a government's imposition of a regulation later abandoned after being
found to constitute an unconstitutional taking, requires that
monetary compensation be paid to an affected landowner for the
period during which the regulation was in effect.' 30 The Court
examined its prior decisions dealing with governmental takings
for limited periods of time,' and found that such temporary takings were indistinguishable from permanent takings in all reulatory taking. Id. at 312. This position caused the United States Supreme Court
to find that the constitutional question was properly before it. Id.
i22 Id. at 312.
123 Id. at 313. The Court uses the phrase "temporary regulatory taking" in reference to "those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by the courts".
Id. at 310.
124 See id. at 314-16.
125 Id. at 315 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
126 See id. at 315-16.
127 Id. at 315. See supra note 18 for an explanation of inverse condemnation.
128 First English, 482 U.S. at 315.
12'9Id. at 316 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922)). The Court cited Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 17778 (1872) for the general proposition that the failure of the government to formally
condemn property should not operate to deny a property owner ofjust compensation where a taking has been affected in all but name. First English, 482 U.S. at 31617.

~o
3

First English, 482 U.S. at 318.

Id. (citing United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958); Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States, 338 U.S. I (1949); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372
(1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (all holding
that federal government's temporary interference with a landowner's use of property requires that compensation be paid)).
'3'
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spects other than duration. 3 2 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that once a taking has been established, compensation is required
33
regardless of whether the taking was permanent or temporary.'In reaching its decision, the Court rejected the government's
contention that invalidation of the offending regulation was sufficient to remedy the injury suffered by a landowner as a result of a
temporary regulatory taking." 4 The Court also rejected the
County's argument that case precedent dictated that a compensable regulatory taking cannot occur until the ordinance challenged
has been held invalid. "5 The Court found that the case law relied on by the County merely supported the theory that compensation due in connection with a taking should be calculated from
the date on which the taking occurred.""'
Having rejected the County's arguments, the Court determined that no subsequent action by a governmental authority
will relieve it of its duty to compensate a landowner for losses
attributable to the taking for the effective period of the regulation. 137 The Court, mindful that its decision might encourage
landowners to assert taking claims for temporary delays in development incurred while seeking individual relief from land use
regulations, limited the scope of its holding by expressly excluding such claims."" The Court suggested that its decision required only that compensation be paid in instances where a
regulation had been in effect for a considerable period of time
and had in fact effected a taking."'
Justice Stevens, joined in part by Justices Blackmun and
132

See id.

1'13 See id. at 318-19.
1:4 1d. at 319. The Court analogized the six year period during which the
County's ordinance was in effect to a six year leasehold interest in Lutherglen
which required payment of just compensation. See id.
135

Id. at 320.

I Id. TIhe County relied on Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939). Id.
In Datfrth the landowner sought interest on a disputed condemnation award,
claiming that the actual taking had occurred before the condemnation proceedings
were commenced. See Danforth, 308 U.S. at 283. The Danforth Court held that
where condemnation proceedings were involved, a taking was not deemed to have
occurred until the requisite amount due the landowner was determined and paid.
Id. at 284.
137 See First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
1-38 See id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens opined that increased litigation would likely result from majority's holding. Id. at 2389-90 (Stevens. .,
dissenting).
39',.)See id. at 322.
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O'Connor, dissented."14 TheJustice argued that the Court erred
in addressing the remedies issue.14 Justice Stevens asserted that
the Court should have ruled either that the Church's complaint
was defective, in that it failed to allege that a taking had occurred,
or that precedent dealing with this type of regulation required a
4 finding that there had been no taking.'
Justice Stevens argued that the proper vehicle for relief in
these cases is the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and not the just compensation clause.' 43 Justice Stevens
reasoned that "it is the Due Process Clause ...that protects the
property owner from improperly motivated, unfairly conducted,
or unnecessarily protracted governmental decisionmaking." 14' 4
Moreover, the Justice noted that damages for any violations of
the due process guarantees are available to an aggrieved landowner through section 1983.'
Accordingly, Justice Stevens
would limit the Court's review of the present case to a decision of
the taking issue without ever reaching the remedies issue. 146
The Supreme Court's decision in First English is supported
by existing precedent enforcing the just compensation requirements of the fifth amendment. 4 ' Although previous decisions of
the Court failed to decide the remedies issue, 4 ' the dissenting
140 Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion is divided into
four parts. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined only in parts I and III. Id.
141 See id. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 324-28 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that regulation of
flood-prone areas is within the valid exercise of the police power of the state and
effected landowners are not entitled to compensation for pecuniary losses sustained as a result of such regulation. Id. at 325-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 339-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Part III of his dissent, Justice Steveis asserted that jurisdictional problems should have precluded the Court from
addressing the remedies issue. See id. at 333-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He focused on the failure of the Church "to exhaust [its] state remedies before confronting the question whether the net result of the state proceedings has amounted
to a temporary taking of property without just compensation." Id. at 338 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, the California state courts merely addressed the right of the state to convert a permanent taking into a temporary taking
through invalidation. Id. at 336-37 (Stevens,J., dissenting). He contended that the
California courts have not addressed the issue of whether damages are available for
(he period prior to invalidation during which the taking was in effect. Id. at 337.
144 Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145 Id. See supra note 101 (discussing section 1983 remedy).
146 See id. at 340-41.
147 See supra notes 343-36 (for references to Court decisions upholding claims
tinder the just compensation clause).
148

See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates V. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);

Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins
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opinions in San Diego Gas & Electric and MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates, collectively represented the views of a majority of the
Court. 4 " These opinions provided a clear indication of the
stance the Court would adopt when finally deciding the remedies
issue. 15 Thus it comes as no surprise that temporary governmental regulations which effect a taking of private property require that just compensation be paid.
In its analysis the Court properly recognized that the sole
issue to be decided was whether a landowner, whose property
has been taken via an unconstitutional land use regulation, has a
right to make a claim for economic loss incurred as a result of
such a taking.'
The Court's holding ensures that landowners
have their day in court. Significantly, the Court also expressly
acknowledged that its decision was based on the assumption that
a taking had in fact occurred. 5 2 By eliminating the question of
whether a taking had occurred, the Court, with no difficulty, was
able to observe that "it is the Constitution that dictates the remedy for interference with property rights amounting to a taking. ' "' Additionally, the Court did not address the measure of
compensation due a landowner whose property has been physically taken as compared to a landowner whose property has been
regulatorily taken. The Court simply recognized that, in either
situation, a method of calculating damages is readily available. 5 4
The landowner, in such situations, is entitled to "the value of the
use of the land during this period."' 5 5 By not addressing the distinctions between types of takings or the extent of the impacts on
property owners necessary for a finding that a taking has ocv. Citv of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (in each case the Court failed to reach the
remedies issue on procedural grounds).
149 In San Diego Gas & Electric, Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices
Stewart, Powell and Marshall. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 636 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also agreed with Justice Brennan's analysis of the
merits. Id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In MVacDonald, Sommer & Frates,

Justice White's dissent was joined in by Chief Justice Burger. MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates, 477 U.S. at 353, 362 (White, J., dissenting).
150 See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 361-64 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting); San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City, of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636661 (1981)

(Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenters advocate a compensation remedy

be required in connection with a regulatory taking).
151 First English, 482 U.S. at 311-13.
152 Id. at 321.
153 Id. at 316 n.9.
154 See id. at 3 18-19.
155 Id. at 319.
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curred, the Court adopted a narrow approach to the remedies
issue.
The Court acted wisely in not addressing the issue of
whether a taking had occurred. By not doing so, the Court was
able to separate the remedies issue from the never ending debate
of when a regulation has "gone too far." Additionally, by limiting its decision to a discussion of the remedies issue, the Court
neither challenged the validity of zoning regulations nor
threatened to convert statutes validly enacted by the states under
the police power into fifth amendment takings.
Despite its limited application, the First English decision will
not be without impact. Prior to First English, state courts and
commentators gave voice to two major concerns related to the
remedies issue. The first is whether the availability of a damages
remedy will have a chilling effect on innovative zoning and land
use planning efforts. The second is the fear that the liability imposed on municipalities from regulatory takings will result in financial disaster, thus curtailing the local government's ability to
provide essential public services.""
The Court responded to these concerns by stating that it was
"not unmindful of these considerations, but they must be evaluated in the light of the command of the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 5 7 Given the deference shown
to legislative policy by the courts, arguably the primary impact of
the First English decision on municipalities and their ability to implement valid land use regulations will be to insure that municipal planning boards adhere to a careful and responsible
regulatory program. Any fiscal threat to a municipality as a result
of the availability of a damages remedy should be minimal 5 8 pro15" See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372-378 (1979), (q11/d on olher groinds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (California
Supreme Court based its decision on "the need for preserving freedom in planning
and the inhibiting financial force which inheres in the inverse condemnation remedy"). See also Comment, supra note 26, at 726-31 (discussing the chilling effect
resulting from allowing a damages remedy and the fears of fiscal problems resulting from allowing a damages remedy). See generaly, Cunningham, supra note 17;
Mandelker, supra note 4 (each discussing Court's attempts to address remedies issue prior to First English and detailing separate theories Supreme Court may follow
when addressing the merits).
157 Firs English, 482 U.S. at 317.
158 The difficultv involved in proving that a regulation constitutes a taking remains unchanged by the Firs Enaglish decision. See id. at 321. Past decisions of the
various state and federal courts indicate that few land use regulations rise to the
level of a taking. See Mandelker, snpra note 4, at 500-02. Ironically, the facts in First
English deal with challenges to a flood plain regulation. As Justice Stevens notes in
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vided that good faith planning efforts are involved, and delay tactics by municipalities to stall landowner challenges to zoning
5 1
regulations are avoided.
While the Court's decision in First English does not represent
a major change in the long standing policy set forth in Pennsylvania Coal, that a regulation which "goes too far" may amount
to a fifth amendment taking, it does open a door for aggrieved
landowners. The First English decision provides an unprecedented link between unconstitutional zoning and the prospect of
a compensation remedy. Consequently, increased litigation is
likely to result.'" By providing landowners with a compensation
remedy, the First English decision enhances the attractiveness of
litigating the issue of whether a taking has occurred. In this respect the First English decision may prove to be problematical.
Few claims for relief are based on standards as nebulous as those
used to determined when a regulation "goes so far" as to constitute a taking. Indeed, the consequences of being frequently
hailed into court to litigate the taking issue could well prove to be
more harmful to the municipal budget than the threat of paying
monetary compensation to aggrieved landowners.
Perhaps the major flaw in the Court's decision in First English
is that it requires that compensation be paid for regulatory takings rather than merely prohibiting the states from limiting the
remedies for regulatory takings to invalidation. While the First
English Court recognized that denying a damages remedy to landowners who have incurred substantial financial losses as a result
of a regulatory taking may fail to satisfy the requirements of the
fifth amendment, it has also denied state courts the flexibility to
apply an invalidation remedy where the landowner's financial
loss has been minimal. Thus, one unfortunate result of the decision is that itmay deprive state courts of the ability to develop
remedies which will redress aggrieved landowner's losses while
not unduly infringing on a municipality's ability to implement
his dissent, "'this Court's precedents demonstrate that the type of regulatory program at issue here cannot constitute a taking." Fist English, 482 U.S. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See BOSSELMAN, supa note 2, at 147-55 (discussing the
constitutional validity of flood plain regulations).
151) Commentators have noted that landowner challenges to land use regulations
can result in an endless stream of expensive litigation since "[tihere is nothing to
prevent the regulating entity from subsequently imposing a modified or alternate
restriction which achieves the same result." Comment, supra note 26, at 732.
") See Fitst English, 482 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his closing remarks, Justice Stevens predicts that the Court's decision will ignite an explosion of
litigation. Id.
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beneficial land-use regulations. 1(1
While the impact of the First English decision cannot be accurately predicted, the policy adopted by the Court will no doubt
require reasonable adaptations to accommodate future
problems. The First English Court, however, had little constitutional alternative but to recognize that where governmental land
use regulations have effected a taking, a policy limiting the landowner to a remedy of invalidation of the offending regulation
does not "meet the demands" of the just compensation
clause." 1652
Sandra Lange Vieser
I6I1 See Comment, supra note 26, 737-40 (discussing advantages of allowing courts
flexibility when determining appropriate remedies).
162

First English, 482 U.S. at 317.

